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Abstract: Spoofing (presentation) attacks are important threats for face recognition and authentication systems, which
try to deceive them by presenting an image or video of a different subject, or by using a 3D mask. Remote (non-contact)
photoplethysmography (rPPG) is useful for liveness detection using a facial video by estimating the heart-rate of the
subject. In this paper, we first compare the presentation attack detection performance of three different rPPG-based
heart rate estimation methods on four datasets (3DMAD, Replay-Attack, Replay-Mobile, and MSU-MFSD). We also
present a cascaded fusion system, which utilizes a multistage ensemble of classifiers using rPPG, motion-based (including
head-pose, eye-gaze and eye-blink), and texture-based features. Experimental results show that the proposed method
outperforms several other presentation attack detection methods in the literature, which utilize rPPG.
Key words: Face recognition, presentation attack detection, non-contact photoplethysmography, rPPG

1. Introduction
Biometric authentication is needed in a wide variety of applications including security, finance, law enforcement,
and education. Biometric authentication systems utilize physiological or behavioral characteristics of a person
such as fingerprint, iris, voice, face, gait, etc. which are prone to spoofing attacks. Face recognition systems,
which utilize images or videos have become prevalent recently. However, these systems may be spoofed using
hyper-realistic three-dimensional face masks or high-resolution photo and video recordings, which are also known
as presentation attacks. It is a challenging task to propose a generalizable solution for face recognition, which
is able to distinguish between a fake (i.e. presentation attack) and a real face.
Presentation attack detection (PAD) using features containing vitality data such as the heart rate
estimated using rPPG has gained importance recently [1], which uses a facial video to estimate the heart
rate of a person. The light absorption/reflection property of the capillary layer of the skin changes proportional
to the volume of blood each time the heart beats. This causes subtle changes in the red, green and blue color
channels of the skin pixels on the face, where green channel has been shown to carry more information. The color
changes have some structural differences due to the absence of a live face in photograph or mask attacks. Based
on these temporal color variations due to pulses, some PAD methods in the literature use features extracted by
an rPPG process for the classification of the face video of a subject as genuine or fake [2, 3].
There are other motion and texture-based features used for presentation attack detection. Recently,
∗ Correspondence:

mehmet.gundogar@architecht.com

3240
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

GÜNDOĞAR and EROĞLU ERDEM/Turk J Elec Eng & Comp Sci

learning-based features have also been used. In a recent survey, [4] hardware and software-based PAD methods
in the literature are summarized. However, this survey does not include recent rPPG-based and deep learningbased PAD methods.
The contributions of this paper are as follows:
• We give a short literature survey of most recent PAD methods, focusing on recent rPPG and deep learningbased methods.
• We compare the performance of three rPPG-based feature extraction methods for presentation attack
detection.
• We present a novel cascaded PAD system, which fuses rPPG, texture, head, and facial motion features at
feature level and/or decision level, using a multi-stage ensemble of classifiers. To the best of our knowledge,
this is the first work that fuses rPPG, texture, and motion-based features in a PAD method.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present a brief literature survey on recent
PAD methods, focusing more on deep learning-based and rPPG-based methods. In Section 3, we give the
details of the proposed cascaded fusion method. In Section 4, we provide our experimental results including the
comparison of three rPPG methods for PAD. Finally, in Section 5, concluding remarks are given.
2. Literature survey of presentation attack detection
In the following subsections, we briefly summarize the literature on PAD which uses 2D images and videos.
2.1. rPPG-based methods
There are studies for PAD, which combine texture-based and rPPG-based features. In [2] heart rate and local
binary pattern (LBP) [5] features are combined to achieve better results for photo and 3D mask attacks since
they do not contain heartbeat related rPPG signals. The same expectation does not apply for video replay
attacks since attack videos still contain rPPG signals, hence only LBP features are employed to detect video
replay attacks in [2]. They identify 68 facial landmarks by the discriminative response map fitting (DRMF)
method [6]. Then, detrending, moving average, and Hamming window-based FIR band-pass filters are applied
to the temporal rPPG signals. Finally, fast fourier transform (FFT) is used to obtain the power spectrum. The
resulting feature vector is used to train a support vector machine (SVM) classifier for the two-class classification
task (genuine/fake).
Hernandez-Ortega et al. [7] collected a new heart rate (HR) dataset that included near-infrared (NIR)
spectral samples as well as RGB images and applied a PAD approach similar to [2]. It was observed that the
NIR spectrum is more resistant to light variations than the RGB spectrum. They also evaluated equal error
rate (EER) metrics using different video length schemes for both RGB and NIR spectrum bands. Heusch et
al. [3] distinguish presentation attacks from genuine accesses using the long-term statistical spectral feature
(LTSS) of the PPG signal and an SVM classifier. Nowara et al. [8] extract the power spectrums separately
from the pixels in three different face regions, which are the forehead, left cheek, and right cheek as well as
two different regions of the background outside the face area and use them as a feature vector for classification.
They train SVM and random forest classifiers and observe that the using spectral features of the background
region positively affect the performance of classification.
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Detection of fake face images and videos produced by generative adversarial networks (GAN) is also
possible using rPPG features [9]. In [9] a novel PPG map feature is introduced and fed into a convolutional
neural network (CNN) with the video frames. They also test the effectiveness of different segment durations for
the probabilistic video classification process.
In general, rPPG-based methods could provide a robust solution for PAD, but they have a diﬀiculty in
the detection of video replay attacks that still contain rPPG signals. Due to this fact, an rPPG-based PAD
solution needs to be supported with additional features for the detection of video replay attacks, which is the
main concern of this paper.

2.2. Deep learning-based methods
It has been observed that combining facial motion and texture using deep learning methods produces promising
results for PAD. Shao et al. [10] train a 5-layer convolutional neural network (CNN) and extract an average
optical flow to realize genuine and fake face classification.
Li et al. [11] train a 3D CNN by replicating spatial and temporal information with a specially designed
data augmentation method. They also apply a spatial augmentation method to detect background variations
in the video and capture the clues of the mediums used in the presentation attack, such as the bezels of the
mobile phone or tablet device used in the attack. This process also considers the segments of the face and uses
them as additional training data for the CNN. As a different data augmentation method, they apply contrast
degree correction flow to the video frames.
Song et al. [12] develop the spatial pyramid coding micro-texture (SPMT) and template face matched
binocular depth (TFBD) features to characterize local appearance information. Along with these features, they
also utilize a single shot detector (SSD) to detect context cues and configure an end-to-end PAD system. TFBD
features require two separate camera images taken from different angles at the same time.
Mohammadi et al. [13] mention the domain-shift problem of PAD methods and propose a novel method
to improve cross-dataset performance by modeling the nuisance factors like lighting conditions and different
camera devices using a face recognition dataset containing millions of bona fide images. Li et al. [14] approach
the generalization problem of PAD as a supervised anomaly detection problem and utilize a hypersphere loss
function.
Recently, a PAD challenge was organized to introduce the multimodal CASIA-SURF dataset [15], which
contains RGB, depth, and infrared (IR) information about the faces. This challenge revealed that ensemble
learning has an exceptional advantage in deep learning. Another observation was that rPPG signals provide
essential differences between genuine and spoof faces. Yang et al. [16] also present a solution to collect a large
amount of live face data and synthesize spoofing data with reflection artifacts. They propose the spatio-temporal
antispoof network (STASN) deep network and report significant performance increase in inter and cross-testing
experiments.
Deep learning-based PAD methods require a large amount of training data. However, most PAD datasets
contain a limited set of data, which is a common impediment of deep learning-based methods. If the dataset
is small, workaround methods such as data augmentation or the use of a different dataset for training may be
utilized. However, if the training and test datasets are different, it will become harder to compare the results
of a PAD method with other PAD methods in the literature.
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2.3. Other methods
Although rPPG-based methods achieve successful results for photo and mask attacks, they are insuﬀicient for
video replay attacks when used alone. Patel et al. [17] use multi-scale LBP (MLBP) and scale-invariant feature
transform (SIFT) methods for the detection of cascading textures occurring in video replay attacks without
using the rPPG signal. The calculated histograms are classified using an SVM classifier. Chingovska et al. [18]
propose the use of client-specific information for anti-spoofing. The proposed solution directly rejects a subject
if the subject is not enrolled in the system (even if the subject is real). Since the solution is dependent on client
data, it is not possible to use it at enrollment time immediately. Hao et al. [19] introduce a solution based on
Siamese CNNs. They train the Siamese neural network with the paired input of enrolled subjects’ images. The
suggested solution first performs face recognition, then retrieves the real image of the identified subject and
uses a client-specific Siamese neural network for genuine or fake classification.
2.4. Datasets
The Replay-Attack [20] dataset contains a total of 1300 face videos collected from 50 subjects. The videos
were recorded using a MacBook camera at a resolution of 320 x 480 pixels. Some of the videos have uniform
background and lighting conditions, and others were recorded in a complex environment with natural lighting
and reflections. The presentation attack tools used are iPad 1, iPhone 3GS, and A4 printed paper. The ReplayMobile [21] dataset contains 1190 videos from 40 subjects. It contains video recordings of high quality and
resolution to reveal more compelling attack scenarios. Recordings were done with iPad Mini2 tablet and LG-G4
smartphone devices using a resolution of 1280 × 720 pixels. The MSU-MFSD [22] dataset contains 280 video
recordings collected from 35 subjects of different ethnic origins under different lighting conditions. Videos were
recorded with the built-in camera of a MacBook Air laptop using a resolution of 640 × 480 pixels and with
the frontal camera of a Google Nexus 5 smartphone using a resolution of 720 × 480 pixels. The 3DMAD
[23] dataset contains 255 videos from 17 subjects. There are ten real videos for each subject and five videos
captured using the physically obtained mask of the subject. Each of the videos has a resolution of 640 × 480
pixels and is recorded with the Kinect device for 10 s. The CASIA FASD [24] dataset consists of 50 genuine
subjects from Asian ethnic regions. It contains three types of face spoofing attacks: warped photo attacks, cut
photo attacks, and video attacks. For each subject, the dataset contains three real and nine fake videos. The
Oulu-NPU [25] dataset contains 4950 videos recorded by the front cameras of six different mobile phones. It
contains print attack clips obtained from two printers and video replay attack clips obtained from two display
devices. The Facebook DeepFake detection challenge [26] contains 10K videos in the blackbox dataset
consisting of real face videos and fake videos generated by deep neural networks. The subjects present diversity
in terms of age, skin tone, and gender attributes.
Table 1 provides an overview of the popular PAD datasets in the literature. Figure 1 shows example
images for genuine images and presentation attacks in four different datasets.
2.5. Evaluation Metrics
In the literature, rPPG-based PAD algorithms generally use the half total error rate (HTER) (4) metric for
performance evaluation, which is calculated using a threshold value ( θ ) that minimizes the EER metric. The
EER corresponds to the point that the false acceptance rate (FAR) is equal to the false rejection rate (FRR).
The HTER metric is calculated using the FAR and FRR metrics with the corresponding EER threshold value
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Table 1. Brief overview of the PAD datasets in the literature.

# of
Attack
Videos

Resolution

Replay-Attack [20]

320 × 240

printed photo,
replay video

50

300

1000

Replay-Mobile [21]

1280 × 720

printed photo,
replay video

40

550

640

MSU-MFSD [22]

640 × 480
720 × 480

mobile photo,
mobile video

35

70

210

Training, Test

3DMAD [23]

640 × 480

3D mask

17

170

85

17-fold
LOOCV

CASIA-FASD [24]

640 × 480
1920 × 1080

50

150

450

Training, Test

OULU-NPU [25]

Six different
resolutions

55

990

3960

Training, Test
Development

Dataset

(a)

warped photo,
cut photo,
replay video
printed photo,
replay video

(b)

# of
Subjects

# of
Genuine
Videos

Attack
Types

(c)

Fold
Structure
Training, Test
Development,
Enrollment
Training, Test
Development,
Enrollment

(d)

Figure 1. The top row shows images of real faces and the bottom row shows images of presentation attacks from the
(a) Replay-Attack, (b) Replay-Mobile, (c) 3DMAD, and (d) MSU-MFSD datasets.

( θ ) as follows:

F AR =
3244

# of false acceptance
# of identification attempts

(1)
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F RR =

# of false rejection
# of identification attempts

EER = the point in the ROC curve where F AR = F RR

HT ER(θ) =

F AR(θ) + F RR(θ)
2

(2)

(3)

(4)

HTER takes values in the range [0, 1] and values closer to the 0 is desired for the experiments for this metric.
3. Cascaded fusion for presentation attack detection
The overall view of the proposed cascaded fusion system PAD is shown in Figure 2. The face video is the input,
which may contain a mask, image or video replay attack. The goal is to determine whether the input video is
a genuine access or a presentation attack. Before feature extraction, we extract the face of interest (ROI) by
employing the Viola–Jones [27] algorithm, which provides a rough alignment of the face. The feature extraction
block consists of the extraction of three types of features: rPPG features, motion-based features (consisting of
head-pose, eye-gaze, eye-blinks), and texture-based features. These blocks will be explained in more detail in
the following sections.
After extraction of the above features, the cascaded fusion block is used for classification. The features
may be fused using different combinations giving longer feature group (FG) vectors, which are then passed
through a feature selection step and classified using specific SVMs for each feature group. Thus, we obtain an
ensemble of classifiers trained on different feature groups. Each SVM in the ensemble gives a probability vector
output for a test video, indicating the probability of it belonging to a certain class. These vectors are then fused
using decision-level fusion approaches. Finally, the fused probability vector is used as a feature vector for the
second phase of the SVM classification. The details of each block will be described in the following sections.
3.1. rPPG Features
Most of the rPPG-based heart rate estimation algorithms in the literature [28–32] analyze changes in the mean
color of the facial region of a subject using these steps:
• The face is detected at each frame and a region of interest (ROI) is specified.
• Skin pixels are determined in the ROI, and the color values of the skin pixels are averaged at each frame,
resulting in temporal signals. This eliminates the background or irrelevant pixels, which may introduce
noise to the rPPG signal.
• The temporal signals are transformed or decomposed into components, one of which is expected to
represent to the heart signal.
• The power spectrum of the component signals are analyzed to estimate the heart rate.
rPPG algorithms are sensitive to changes in illumination and motion of the subject. Some algorithms
implement additional pre-processing steps to improve their performance. In this work, we compared three
3245
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FEATURE EXTRACTION
Facial ROI Extraction

rPPG Features

VIOLA-JONES
FACE DETECTOR

rPPG Signal Extraction
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t=n
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.

skin pixel detection

t=1
t=0

REC

Motion-Based Features
VIDEO
INPUT

Texture-Based Features

Extract Head-Pose,
ÊEye-Gaze, Eye-Blink Features

Apply Anisotropic
Diffusion Filter

Extract
HoG Features

Select Speciﬁc Parts of
HoG Features

CLASSIFICATION USING CASCADED FUSION
FEATURE-LEVEL FUSION

FEATURE GROUP 2Ê Ê Ê

SVM CLASSIFICATION
(2 n d Phase)

GENUINE
ACCESS
FINAL
RESULT
PRESENTATIONÊ
ATTACK

TRAIN & CLASSIFY
(2 n d Feature Group)Ê

.....

FEATURE GROUP NÊ Ê Ê

TRAIN & CLASSIFY
(1 s t Feature Group)Ê

.....

.....

.....

FEATURE SELECTION

FEATURE GROUP 1Ê Ê Ê

SVM CLASSIFICATION
(1 s t Phase)

TRAIN & CLASSIFY
(Nth Feature Group)Ê

SVM PREDICTION OUTPUTS
FOR EACHÊFEATURE GROUPÊ ÊÊ

TRAIN & CLASSIFY
WITH
DECISION LEVEL
FUSION AS INPUT

DECISION-LEVEL FUSION

Figure 2. Overall view of the proposed presentation attack detection for face recognition method using cascaded fusion.
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methods for extraction of rPPG features, which are briefly described below. For further details, the reader is
referred to the respective papers.
Spatial subspace rotation (2SR) [28]: The 2SR algorithm requires facial ROI detection and skin pixels
extraction from the facial ROI of a subject. After detection of face ROI, the algorithm estimates the Gaussian
parameters of the skin color distribution for the cropped face image. This step computes the mean and covariance
matrix of the skin pixels in the normalized red-green color space to obtain a skin mask for given threshold input.
After that, the algorithm calculates the eigenvalues and eigenvectors from the skin color correlation matrix. At
each frame, the rPPG signal building process begins with the use of these eigenvalues and eigenvectors.
Let C denote the skin color correlation matrix calculated for the face at the k th frame and U k = {uki }
and Λk = {λki } are the corresponding eigenvectors and eigenvalues. Subspace rotation SR vector in a single
stride (temporal window) is calculated as [28]:
√
SR =

λk1 k T τ τ T
u u u +
λτ2 1 2 2

√

λk1 k T τ τ T
u u u
λτ3 1 3 3

(5)

where λτi and uτi , i = 2, 3 are the eigenvalues and eigenvectors for the reference frame τ .
Also in the current stride, multiple SR vectors are calculated between the reference and successive frames,
and they are concatenated in a trace SR . Then, the pulse signal for that stride is built using the first two
traces SR1 , SR2 in the trace SR as [28]:
p = SR1 −

σ(SR1 )
SR2
σ(SR2 )

(6)

where σ is the standard deviation operator.
The final pulse signal is estimated with accumulating the (p − µ(p)) value calculated in each stride as
[28]:
P = P + (p − µ(p))

(7)

where µ(p) is the mean signal calculated for the current stride.
Chrominance-Based rPPG (CHROM) [31]: The CHROM algorithm obtains the skin color signals from a
subject’s facial ROI at each frame of a video sequence. Similar to the 2SR algorithm, estimation of the Gaussian
parameters of the skin color distribution is performed to gather a skin mask using the provided threshold. The
algorithm projects the mean skin color calculated from the RGB color space to the defined chrominance XY
space to achieve robustness to illumination variations as follows [31]:
X = (3.0 ∗ r) − (2.0 ∗ g)
Y = (1.5 ∗ r) + g − (1.5 ∗ b)

(8)

where r, g, and b corresponds to the values of the red, green, and blue color channels, respectively. Later on,
the algorithm applies a bandpass filter in the chrominance space.
Li’s CVPR14 [32]: In this algorithm, first, skin color signals from the facial ROI of each video frame
are estimated. The color signals of the background are also used to reduce the impact of global illumination
variations. Let gf ace denote the mean green value of pixels obtained from the face ROI and let gbg denote the
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mean green value of pixels of the background ROI extracted from the top-left part of the video frame. The
relation between them is:
gf ace = s + y
(9)
y ≈ hgbg
where s denotes the green value variations due to the cardiac pulse and y denotes the green value variations
for the illumination changes. The illumination rectified signal gIR is defined as [32]:
gIR = s + (y − hgbg )

(10)

Then, a normalized least mean square (NLMS) filter is applied to calculate the optimal h value. After obtaining
the illumination rectified signal, it is divided into temporal segments and segments having a high standard
deviation are removed to eliminate the effects of motion. In the final step, the algorithm applies a detrending
filter, a moving average filter, and a Hamming window-based finite impulse response bandpass filter to build
the rPPG signal.
We first estimate the rPPG signal using one of the three algorithms mentioned above and then estimate
the power spectrum density (PSD) of the rPPG signal P (f ). Then, the peak frequency of the PSD with the
maximum power value is detected in the frequency range [0.7Hz, 4Hz]. Finally, similar to the methods in [2],
[33], the frequency corresponding to the highest peak is multiplied by 60 to obtain a heart rate estimate between
42 beats-per-minute (bpm) and 240 bpm.
We used the implementations of the three algorithms given in Bob’s toolbox [34]. We represented the
rPPG-based feature vector in two different ways:
• Let fmax denote the frequency, which has the highest power in P (f ) , i.e. fmax = arg maxf P (f ). Then,
we calculate the following ratio [2]:
Γ= ∑

P (fmax )
∀f ∈[0.7,4] P (f )

(11)

The two dimensional rPPG feature vector is then formed as:
P P G1 = [P (fmax ), Γ].

(12)

• We also used the magnitude of the power spectrum of the rPPG signal ( P (f ) ) as a feature vector after
band-pass filtering with a passband [0.7Hz, 4Hz]:
P P G2 = |P (f )|,

(13)

which gives us a 1 × 541 dimensional feature vector.
3.2. Motion-based features
Although rPPG features are beneficial for liveness detection, they are not suﬀicient to distinguish all kinds of
presentation attacks as the pulse signal still exists in a video replay attack. Illumination variations in a video
can also impact the rPPG feature extraction process negatively. Hence, we used motion-based features of the
head and face for PAD. We utilized the OpenFace 2.0 [35–39] toolbox for the extraction of motion features. For
the motion-based features, face alignment is done by Open Face 2.0 toolbox with the utilization of estimated
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landmark points on the face. We estimate the eye-blink, eye-gaze angle, and head-pose features at each frame
and calculate their mean to use as features for a video. These motion features are expected to be useful
for detecting photo attacks since photo attacks have no eye-blinks and no significant eye-gaze and head-pose
changes.
The blink feature will be denoted by BLIN K , which is a scalar. If there is no eye-blink in a video, the
value of the blink feature will be 0, otherwise it will be 1. Eye-blinks are detected based on the openness and
closeness states of both eyes. OpenFace 2.0 uses the HOG features of each frame to detect eye-blinks.
→
→
→
Gaze angle ( α ) corresponds to the angle between the −
u and −
v vectors, where −
u is the vector between
→
the pupil location (point P) and the point of interest (I - which is the attention point of the subject), and −
v
is the vector between point P and the camera center (point C) [40], as illustrated in Figure 3. Let’s denote the
gaze angle feature vector as EY EGAZE = [µ(∠x ), µ(∠y )], where ∠x and ∠y indicate the eye-gaze direction
→
in radians in world coordinates averaged for both eyes, which depend on the vector −
u in Figure 3 and µ(·) is
the mean operator over video frames.
y

I
P
C
z

camera

x

Figure 3. Illustration of computation of gaze angle.

The head-pose feature vector is six-dimensional:
HEADP OSE = µ(LOCx ), µ(LOCy ), µ(LOCz ), µ(ROTx ), µ(ROTy ), µ(ROTz )]

(14)

where LOCxk , LOCyk , LOCzk represents the location of the head with respect to the camera, and ROTxk , ROTyk , ROTzk
represents the rotation angles around the x, y, z axes for the k th frame.
We first performed preliminary experiments on the Replay-Attack and Replay-Mobile datasets to see the
impact of motion-based features. We anticipated that these features could provide high classification accuracy,
especially for the photo attack presentations since there is lack of face and head motion in photo attacks.
Consequently, extracted eye-blink, eye-gaze, and head-pose features from photo attack presentations could
exhibit similar patterns. According to our initial experimental results utilizing the motion-based feature set
{BLIN K, EY EGAZE, HEADP OSE} , the classification accuracy on the photo attack labeled videos of the
Replay-Attack and the Replay-Mobile datasets were 94.16% and 94.44%, respectively. Thus, in order to improve
the performance of the proposed PAD system, we also decided to utilize the motion-based features together
with other features.
3.3. Texture-based features
Texture-based features are useful for discriminating flat patterns such as the surface of the masks used in 3D
mask attacks. We apply an anisotropic diffusion filter on facial ROI to smooth the frames and reduce noise as a
preprocessing step since the fake presentations have been shown to be affected more from this filter [41]. After
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the application of anisotropic diffusion filter, we extract the HoG feature descriptors for each of the 81 face
regions indicated by numbered yellow squares in Figure 4 that consists of 31 bins corresponding to the angles
from 0 to 360 in increments of 12 °. The magnitude values are added to the corresponding bins representing
their direction.
If we concatenate the HoG feature descriptors for the selected 81 face regions, the dimension of the HOG
feature vector becomes 1 × 2511 (81 face regions × 31 bins). We will denote the texture feature vector as
HOG .

Figure 4. (left) HoG features of each cell (right) Corresponding facial region cells. The HoG feature descriptors of the
yellow squares are concatenated to obtain the HOG feature vector to represent the face.

3.4. Feature-level fusion and feature selection
In order to test the effectiveness of various feature combinations, we introduce a feature-level fusion step for combining different feature vectors in our feature set {P P G1 , P P G2 , BLIN K, EY EGAZE, HEADP OSE, HOG}
in order to form different feature groups, which will be denoted as F Gi , where i = 1, . . . , N .
We tested all semantic combinations of feature groups and selected the ones giving the best experimental
results, which resulted in the feature groups shown in the second column of Table 2. In order to improve the
classification accuracy and reduce overfitting, we apply feature selection by utilizing the extra-trees classifier
[42], which provides feature importances. Each decision tree uses the original training samples. For each tree, k
randomly selected features are provided, and the tree selects the best feature to split the data using a criterion
such as the Gini index [43] or entropy [44]. This random sampling method creates multiple decorrelated decision
trees. Each feature’s importance is calculated using the Gini index, and the features are listed in descending
order. It is expected that the Gini index is equal to 0 for a split which gives perfect classification. When using
the Gini criterion, the probability of each class is calculated for each feature in each branch of a built tree. Then
the sum of the squared probabilities is subtracted from 1, which gives us the value of the Gini index. The sum
of the calculated Gini indexes of each split is used to calculate feature importances.
After feature ranking, we eliminate the less important features according to a certain threshold (for our
experiments we eliminated 10% of the features considering their importance order) to improve the performance
of SVM classifiers ( 1st phase) trained on the N different feature groups. Hence, we obtain an ensemble
of N classifiers, the outputs of which are 1 × 2 dimensional probability vectors for two-class classification
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(genuine/attack) as [pigenuine , piattack ] for the ith SVM classifier. We also employed three-class classification
(genuine/photo attack/video-replay attack), the outputs of which are 1 × 3 dimensional probability vectors as
[pigenuine , piphotoattack , pivideoattack ] for the ith SVM classifier.

3.5. Decision-level fusion
We introduce a decision-level fusion step to combine the results of N feature groups (if N > 1 in an experiment).
In the first phase (see Figure 2), we train N SVM classifiers in an ensemble using each feature group. Each
of these SVM classifiers will give a probability vector as output containing the genuine class and presentation
attack class probabilities. In two-class classification, we will get a probability vector of dimensions 1 × 2 for
each SVM. Sum of the probability values in this 1 × 2 dimensional probability vector is equal to 1, that is
pigenuine + piattack = 1 for the SVM output of the ith feature group. Similarly, for three-class classification,
pigenuine + piphotoattack + pivideoattack = 1 .
We concatenate the N genuine class probabilities pigenuine , which are produced by the N SVM classifiers
in the 1st phase corresponding to the N feature groups. Feature vector obtained after this concatenation is
denoted as F , which is 1 × N dimensional:
F = [p1genuine , p2genuine , ..., pN
genuine ]

(15)

Then, in the second phase, we train another single SVM to classify the input video as an attack or genuine
presentation (see Figure 2). If the value of pigenuine is closer to 1 for most of the selected feature groups, it is
expected that the classification will result in a genuine access decision.

4. Experimental results
In this section we first experimentally compare the three rPPG estimation methods (2SR, CHROM, Li’s
CVPR14) in terms of their PAD performance on four datasets (3DMAD, Replay Attack, Replay Mobile, MSUMFSD), which include different types of spoofing attacks as mask, photo and video-replay attacks. Then, we
give the results of the proposed cascaded fusion method.

4.1. Experimental setup
For the experiments on the 3DMAD dataset videos, we adopted a leave-one-subject-out-cross-validation (LOOCV)
protocol similar to [2, 45]. Since there are 17 subjects in this dataset, we have 17 folds in our experiments.
At each fold, we leave one subject for testing and the remaining subjects are split equally into training and
development sets. For the Replay-Attack and the Replay-Mobile datasets, we use the given train, development,
and test partitions provided in the grandtest protocol similar to the studies in [3, 8]. For the MSU-MFSD
dataset, we use the given train and test partitions, which were also used in the experiments in [2]. For the
3DMAD, Replay-Attack, and Replay-Mobile datasets, we report the results with the HTER metric. Since the
MSU-MFSD dataset does not contain any development fold for the experiments, we report the results for this
dataset with the EER metric.
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4.2. Experimental comparison of rPPG methods for PAD
The experimental results in terms of HTER and EER using the 2D PPG ( P P G1 defined in (12)) and magnitude
features ( P P G2 defined in (13)) extracted using three different rPPG algorithms are given in the first six rows
in Table 2 as configurations [config-1 - config-6]. We can observe that the magnitude features extracted with the
CHROM algorithm give the smallest HTER for the 3DMAD ( 8.82% ) and the Replay-Attack (11.25%) datasets.
On the other hand, the 2SR algorithm performs better on the Replay-Mobile and the MSU-MFSD datasets as
compared to the CHROM algorithm. The magnitude features extracted by the Li’s CVPR14 algorithm also
improves the classification performance on the Replay-Mobile dataset.
4.3. Experiments for evaluating cascaded fusion
In our experiments, we focused on the impact of the feature-level and decision-level fusion phases of our
PAD system. The experimental results for different configurations are presented in Table 2 as experimental
configurations config-7 - config-11. In config-7 setup, we fuse all types of features (rPPG, texture-based, and
motion-based) in a single feature group. Since config-7 uses a single feature group, the decision-level fusion
property is not active in this setup. In config-8 setup, we only use rPPG-based features extracted using
CHROM algorithm in a single feature group without utilizing decision-level fusion. In the config-9 setup, we
only use rPPG features obtained by the CHROM algorithm and apply a decision level fusion with two feature
groups. In the config-10 setup, we place each type of feature in a single feature group and try to see the impact
of decision-level fusion. In the last configuration (config-11), we try to see the impact of a semantic grouping of
features as separate feature groups. In this setup, the first feature group contains only PPG features, the second
feature group contains texture-based features, and the third feature group contains motion-based features.
Experiments are performed on a MacBook Pro 13-inch laptop with a 2.4 GHz Quad-Core Intel Core i5
processor. It takes on average 24 s to detect the face region and extract PPG features for a 10 s long video with
a resolution of 320 × 240. Using the OpenFace 2.0 toolbox, the average elapsed time is about 9 s to extract
HOG, BLIN K, EY EGAZE , and HEADP OSE features. Feature selection takes approximately 5 s and SVM
classification takes less than a second.
4.4. Discussion and comparison of the results
As it can be observed from Table 2, fusing all types of features in a single group (config-7) only gives the best
result for the 3DMAD dataset (0.58% HTER), which has only mask attacks. Besides, for the 3DMAD dataset
the HTER values are very low as 0.58%, 1.47%, and 0.88% in config-7, config-10, and config-11, respectively,
where all these configurations contain HOG features in common. Based on these results, we can make an
inference that HOG features perform well on the mask attacks. For the other datasets, which contain different
types of attacks, concatenating all features does not give the best results. Using only rPPG features (config-8)
provides the best HTER (4.62%) for the Replay-Attack dataset. The same setup does not work on the ReplayMobile dataset because the Replay-Mobile dataset contains more variety of presentation attacks including highresolution matte-screen videos and photo attacks printed on matte-papers. This variety impacts the performance
of PAD with rPPG features negatively (config-8 and config-9) since a video replay attack generated with a
matte-screen video still contains a high-quality pulse signal and it is too hard to discriminate it from a genuine
video. The MSU-MFSD dataset differs from other datasets in terms of the varying ethnicity of the subjects and
challenging illumination conditions. This case directly impacts the performance of the rPPG process and as a
consequence, only the utilization of rPPG features (config-8 and config-9) or using all features in a single feature
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Table 2. The tested configurations for feature-level and decision-level fusion phases.
Experimental
configuration
Id
config-1
config-2
config-3
config-4
config-5
config-6

config-7

config-8
config-9

config-10

config-11

Feature-level
fusion details*
FG1:{P P G1−chrom } - dim:1×2
FG1:{P P G2−chrom } - dim:1×541
FG1:{P P G1−2sr } - dim:1×2
FG1:{P P G2−2sr } - dim:1×541
FG1:{P P G1−cvpr14 } - dim:1×2
FG1:{P P G2−cvpr14 } - dim:1×541
FG1:{P P G2−chrom ,
BLIN K, EY EGAZE,
HEADP OSE, HOG}
dim:1×(541+1+2+6+2511)=1×3061
FG1:{P P G1−chrom , P P G2−chrom }
dim:1×(2+541)=1×543
FG1:{P P G1−chrom } dim:1×2
FG2:{P P G2−chrom } dim:1×541
FG1:{P P G1−chrom } dim:1×2
FG2:{P P G2−chrom } dim:1×541
FG3:{P P G1−2sr } dim:1×2
FG4:{P P G2−2sr } dim:1×541
FG5:{BLIN K} dim:1×1
FG6:{EY EGAZE} dim:1×2
FG7:{HEADP OSE} dim:1×6
FG8:{HOG} dim:1×2511
FG1:{P P G1−chrom , P P G2−chrom }
dim:1×543
FG2:{HOG} dim:1×2511
FG3:{BLIN K, EY EGAZE,
HEADP OSE} dim:1×9

Decision
level
fusion
status**
Passive
Passive
Passive
Passive
Passive
Passive

3DMAD
(HTER)

Replay
Attack
(HTER)

Replay
Mobile
(HTER)

MSU
MFSD
(EER)

21.76%
8.82%
22.64%
11.76%
37.35%
41.02%

33.75%
11.25%
45.62%
49.37%
42.47%
31.12%

45.42%
54.8%
29.26%
47.27%
42.37%
24.43%

37.61%
60.15%
40.0%
35.83%
43.49%
50.0%

Passive

0.58%

50.0%

24.92%

48.33%

Passive

41.17%

4.62%

54.64%

51.66%

Active

36.47%

5.87%

54.19%

45.0%

Active

1.47%

10.25%

14.23%

27.5%

Active

0.88%

17.0%

11.69%

35.0%

*The acronym FG represents a feature group. In each experimental configuration, different feature groups are tested. For each FG a separate
SVM classifier is trained. Dimensions (dim) of each feature group is also indicated in the second column.
**Decision-level fusion does not exist when there is a single feature group in the corresponding experimental configuration. If there are more
than one feature groups in an experimental configuration, a second phase SVM is utilized.

group (config-7) does not provide acceptable results for the MSU-MFSD dataset. After using the decision-level
fusion setups (config-10 and config-11), we see the real contribution of the decision-level fusion step of our PAD
system on the Replay Mobile and MSU-MFSD datasets as compared to using only the feature-level fusion or
using only rPPG features, since the HTER are smaller.
The best results for each dataset are obtained using different feature groups, which can be considered as
a domain-shift problem related to the structural differences of the datasets [13]. As listed in Table 1, properties
of all PAD datasets differ from each other in terms of the resolution of the videos and the variety of attack
types. Besides, spoofing mediums, different types of camera devices used for video recordings, illumination
conditions, ethnicity of the subjects, and other environmental conditions are all important factors that impact
the results of experiments on PAD. Since we performed our experiments on datasets with different properties,
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best performing configurations are different for each dataset. Figure 5 illustrates the t-distributed stochastic
neighbor embedding (t-SNE) [46] plot obtained with the feature vectors of config-7 in Table 2, extracted from
the Replay-Attack, Replay-Mobile, 3DMAD, and MSU-MFSD datasets. In t-SNE, high-dimensional feature
data is projected onto a two-dimensional space for the visualization of a dataset. As we can see from the t-SNE
plot, the datasets form separate clusters with different distributions, which shows us the domain-shift problem
caused by various factors mentioned in the above paragraph.
80
3DMAD - Genuine Sample
3DMAD - Presentation Attack Sample
REPLAY-ATTACK - Genuine Sample
REPLAY-ATTACK - Presentation Attack Sample
REPLAY-MOBILE - Genuine Sample
REPLAY-MOBILE - Presentation Attack Sample
MSU-MFSD - Genuine Sample
MSU-MFSD - Presentation Attack Sample
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Figure 5. The t-SNE plot of the features used in config-7 in Table 2 for the Replay-Attack, Replay-Mobile, 3DMAD,
and MSU-MFSD datasets. Genuine and presentation attack samples of each dataset are shown with circles and triangles,
respectively.

However, grouping similar features and adopting decision-level fusion provides promising results on
challenging datasets. For instance grouping similar features and using three different feature groups as in
config-11 with decision-level fusion provide a dramatic decrease in the value of HTER from 24.92% to 11.69%
for the Replay-Mobile dataset, which is much better than using the same types of features in a single feature
group as in config-7. Since the final step of decision-level fusion process is based on the genuine class probability
output of each separate feature group, we can infer that the second phase SVM is a process that performs a
consultation among the separate decisions of each feature group to give its final decision regarding how genuine
a subject is. On the other hand, using a single feature group is solitary decision which could not produce better
results as compared to using decision-level fusion.
The experimental results compared with other studies in the literature are given in Table 3. Our cascaded
fusion system which utilizes rPPG features outperforms some of the rPPG-based PAD methods [2, 3, 8] as shown
in Table 3. Our results are comparable with the results reported in [2, 3, 8] since we use the same test protocols
for the datasets in our experiments as mentioned in the experimental setup section. However, some of the
deep learning-based and texture-based methods in the literature give lower HTER as compared to our study,
but most of them apply specific data augmentation methods or specific techniques adopted to a single dataset
without any generalization property to obtain better results. For instance, in [2], the LBP-based method gives
perfect results for the 3DMAD dataset with the achievement of 0% HTER value, but the same method fails
on another REAL-F dataset with varying HTER values between 26% and 47%. In the same study [2], the
pulse-based method gives more stable results for both 3DMAD and REAL-F datasets.
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Table 3. Comparison of rPPG-based pad results using HTER (%) for four datasets.

Methodology
Li CVPR + LTSS [3]
PPG [8]
CHROM + LTSS [3]
2SR + LTSS [3]
PPG + LBP [2]
Proposed method (config-7)
Proposed method (config-8)
Proposed method (config-10)
Proposed method (config-11)

3DMAD
17.0
43.0
29.0
13.0
7.94
0.58
41.17
1.47
0.88

Replay-Attack
16.1
25.5
20.9
5.9
50.0
4.62
10.25
17.0

Replay-Mobile
32.5
35.9
38.1
37.7
24.92
54.64
14.23
11.69

MSU-MFSD
35.0
31.7
50.6
43.3
36.67
48.33
52.08
27.5
35.0

5. Conclusion and future work
In this paper, we investigated the use of rPPG features together with motion and texture features for presentation
attack detection for face recognition. Liveness detection with the utilization of rPPG features is an essential
factor for obtaining successful results on PAD, especially on mask and photo attacks. However, rPPG-based
PAD has an impediment that it is not possible to extract rPPG features on short length videos. In addition,
the experimental results reveal that rPPG features are not suﬀicient for every type of attack scenario, especially
video attacks. After augmentation of rPPG features with additional discriminative motion and texture-based
features, we obtained lower HTER. The proposed method is supported by different feature types and does not
rely on very large training data as deep learning-based methods require. Therefore, it provides a solution for
the presentation attack scenarios, which can not be handled by rPPG-based or deep learning-based solutions
mentioned in Section 2.
The experimental results show that the approach of concatenating a limited set of features into a single
feature group may not give the optimum results. Since the availability of features and datasets for PAD are
limited, decision-level fusion is also an essential factor for improving PAD performance when dealing with
different types and groups of features. The results of our experiments demonstrate that the contribution of the
same features to the performance of a PAD system using decision-level fusion is higher as compared to using
them only in feature-level fusion.
Each PAD dataset has different characteristics due to the included attack types, used spoofing mediums,
diversity of the recording device, and different illumination conditions of the video records. These are the
primary reasons for the domain-shift problem as shown in Figure 5, which also prevents us from finding a
seamless working cascaded fusion configuration for all datasets. There is no guarantee for any PAD solution to
work perfect for an unseen blackbox PAD dataset. As future work, we will try to adopt our cascaded fusion
approach to deep learning-based methods by utilizing more than one deep learning models to achieve a more
generalizable PAD framework.
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